Showing posts with label European Debt Crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label European Debt Crisis. Show all posts
Ferguson on Krugtron

Ferguson on Krugtron

A fun show is breaking out. Niall Ferguson on “Krugtron the invincible.”

Paul Krugman, for a while now, has been lambasting those he disagrees with by trumpeting their supposed “predictions” which came out wrong, and using words like “knaves and fools” to describe them – when he’s feeling polite. These claims often are based on a rather superficial, if any, study of what the people involved actually wrote, mirroring the sudden narcolepsy of Times fact-checkers any time Krugman steps in to the room. Niall has lately been a particular target of this calumnious campaign.

Niall’s fighting back. “Oh yeah? Let’s see how your "predictions” worked out!“ Don’t mess with a historian. He knows how to check the facts. This is only "part 1!” Ken Rogoff seems to be on a similar tear. (and a new item here.) This will be worth watching.

As regular blog readers know, I don’t think science advances by evaluating soothsaying. You make good unconditional predictions with very badly wrong structural models, and very good structural models make bad unconditional predictions.  The talent of predicting and the talent of understanding are largely uncorrelated.  The judgmental forecasts of individuals are poor ways to evaluate any serious economic or scientific theory.  I carefully don’t make “predictions” for just that reason. So, I don’t regard this cheery deconstruction effort as a useful way to show that Krugman’s “model,” whatever it is, is wrong. I also can’t see that anyone but the devoted choir of lemmings is paying much attention to Krugman’s mudslinging any more.  But it is nice that Niall and Ken are taking the effort to ask the great doctor if perhaps he also doesn’t need a bit of healing; perhaps they will force Krugman to go back to actually writing about economics. 

Update: Benn Steil Chimes in, this time on the Baltics, Iceland, and the supposed wonders of currency devaluation.

Rogoff on UK Defaults

Rogoff on UK Defaults

Ken Rogoff wrote a very interesting FT oped on UK finances (FT original, Rogoff webpage if you can’t see FT.)

The issue: Should we worry about huge sovereign debts of advanced countries? Or was the only problem with fiscal stimulus that it was not big enough?


A little history:
Yes, from the 1800s until the first world war, the UK was a global superpower that commanded vast colonial resources and investments. Over long periods, these foreign assets yielded returns well in excess of interest on debt. But comparing government debt ratios back then, when the UK was a massive net creditor, to debt ratios today, when British foreign liabilities exceed foreign assets, is utterly misleading. Moreover, back in the 1820s, the UK was pioneering the industrial revolution; things are not quite the same today. Back then, the UK did not have to worry about pension liabilities or existential threats to the banking system that could require massive injections of cash to fix. …

During the 1930s, Britain defaulted on debt to the US accumulated during the first world war and its aftermath. …

It is often stated that after the second world war the UK debt reached almost 250 per cent of gross domestic product and was brought down merely through growth and inflation. This is a myth …

Then there is the high-inflation era of the 1970s – another de facto default. Last but not least, what about the UK’s serial dependence on International Monetary Fund bailouts from the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s? This is hardly a country with an indestructible credit status. …

Being a UK bondholder has had its ups and downs.

Looking forward, an important point: a country needs to be substantially below its ultimate borrowing limit, or it loses its ability to fight crises going ahead.
..a euro collapse would have triggered a stampede out once investors realised that the UK banks and trade would be savaged, a flexible currency notwithstanding. In that scenario, UK leaders would have been forced to close massive budget deficits almost overnight. That would have been truly catastrophic austerity. …

We now know the euro did not collapse. [yet – JC] With 20-20 hindsight, yes, the UK could have borrowed more. But we do not have hindsight at the moment decisions have to be taken. 
Kan and Carmen Reinhart have been at the receiving end of Paul Krugman’s tender commentaries lately, and I’m interested to see Ken taking up the issue. Krugman likes to lambaste people for “predictions” that he imagines they made which didn’t come out. On the euro blowing up, Ken seems to be offering a taste of his own medicine, made more bitter by the fact that Krugman actually did say what Ken says he said:
…This was the big call – the one that everyone was focusing on. To state that credit risk was gone by 2010 is ludicrous. None other than The New York Times columnist Paul Krugman prognosticated the euro’s early demise regularly from April 2010 to July 2012. His big call has turned out – so far – to be dead wrong.
I will be curious if we see more of that from Ken. Stay tuned.
Local Austerity

Local Austerity


The Wall Street Journal had a really heart-warming article, Europe’s Recession Sparks Grass-Roots Political Push  about groups taking over local governments in southern Europe, and cleaning out years of mismanagement. An excerpt

At her inauguration Ms. Biurrun [the new mayor of Torroledones, Spain] choked up before a jubilant crowd.

Then she began slashing away. She lowered the mayor’s salary by 21%, to €49,500 a year, trimmed council members’ salaries and eliminated four paid advisory positions.

She got rid of the police escort and the leased car, and gave the chauffeur a different job. She returned a carpet, emblazoned with the town seal, that had cost nearly €300 a month to clean. She ordered council members to pay for their own meals at work events instead of billing the town.

“I was so indignant seeing what these people had been doing with everyone’s money as if it were their own,” Ms. Biurrun said.

Those cuts, combined with savings achieved by renegotiating contracts for garbage pickup and other services, helped give a million-euro boost to the city treasury in her first year in office.
Great, no?

But wait, isn’t this all “austerity?” Isn’t cutting spending  exactly the kind of thing that Keynesian macroeconomists, as well as the reigning IMF-style policy consensus decries, saying we need stimulus now, austerity later?

Keynesian, and especially new-Keynesian economics wants more government spending, even if completely wasted. Those trimmed salaries, fired “advisers,” cleaning bills, restaurant spending, overpaid contracts are, in the standard mindset, all crucial for “demand” and goosing GDP.  If stimulus advocates were at all honest, they would be writing blog posts decrying Ms. Birrun and her kind.

Of course they don’t. Abstract “spending” sounds good, and touting abstract “topsy-turvy” model predictions sounds fine.  But when it is concrete, it’s so patently absurd that you don’t hear it.
The Greek city of Thessaloniki cut costs after Yannis Boutaris, a businessman-turned-politician, took office in late 2010 and ended City Hall’s relationship with a few selected providers. Competitive bidding has saved the city 80% of its previous spending on accounting, 25% on waste disposal trucks and 20% on printer paper. The savings have allowed Mr. Boutaris to spend more on social services, even while cutting taxes and paying down City Hall’s debt to suppliers.
How sad. So much “demand”-destroying “austerity.”

(Of course, the main point of the articles is about a political realignment, in which local governments are becoming responsive to local voters, transparent, and efficient, rather than being cronyist machines of national political parties. I can’t imagine anyone not feeling warm about that!)

Update: Courtesy Marginal Revolution, I found this nice story about the new Spanish $680 million submarine that will sink if put in water.  MR snarkily asks “did this help Spain or hurt Spain.” $680 million of government spending raises Spanish GDP by nearly $1 billion, so this is great, right?
Cyprus and Resolution Authority

Cyprus and Resolution Authority


Holman Jenkins has a revealing Cyprus update in today’s Wall Street Jounal. For those of you who haven’t been following the news, Cyprus’ banks failed, borrowing huge amounts of money and investing it in Greek debt (yes).  Cyprus was bailed out by the EU after a chaotic week, including an agreement that large depositors would lose some money, called a “bail-in.”


Since us economists have been saying that unsecured creditors and uninsured depositors should lose money when banks fail, it was sort of a watershed moment. I expressed some reservations at the political, discretionary, and chaotic nature of the bail-in. It turns out I underestimated that nature.

From Holman:

A few weeks ago, the Central Bank of Cyprus published a curious set of “clarifications for the better understanding of the resolution measures.” The principle of a bail-in—that uninsured creditors should suffer losses before taxpayers are on the hook—turns out to contain a few lacunae. “Financial institutions, the government, municipalities, municipal councils and other public entities, insurance companies, charities, schools, and educational institutions” will be excused from contributing to the depositor haircuts, though insurers later were removed from the exempt list.

There will be no haircut on the €9 billion ($11.8 billion) the European Central Bank injected, for political reasons, in 2012 to keep Cyprus’s Laiki Bank temporarily afloat—€9 billion that has now somehow become a liability of Bank of Cyprus depositors, whose losses are bigger as a result.
…
We should mention another possible offense, in a sense, against creditor priority in reports that certain connected customers withdrew funds just before the haircuts. A daughter and son-in-law of Cyprus’s president seem to make a good case that their transfer of €10.5 million to a London bank was a coincidence, but then they proffered a “voluntary haircut” anyway via a donation to a church fund for the poor. Hmm
…
we have to chuckle when legislators on Capitol Hill talk about ending “too big to fail"—as if there is any chance of stopping politicians from bailing out whatever institutions politicians decide their own interests require bailing out, or any chance of imposing legal order on what are invariably chaotic, highly politicized decisions in the heat of crisis.
…
Cyprus turns out to be a good template after all. Modern financial systems may be incompatible with the rule of law that mankind has labored so mightily to build over the centuries.
This all matters for our financial "reform.” Recall, lots of financial institutions were bailed out in 2008-2009, meaning really that their creditors were bailed out. (Normally, when an institution fails, who gets what is determined by bankruptcy law; the creditors become the new owners, the institution is suddenly recapitalized, and either continues or is carved up depending on what makes more sense to the new owners.)

On the theory that “bankruptcy doesn’t work for big banks” the Dodd-Frank law posits a “Resolution Authority,” composed of Administration officials, that will sit in the place of bankruptcy court and decide who loses money, with pretty much discretion to do what they want. To get paid off, make sure you persuade the “authority” that you losing money would be a “systemic” danger. It might help to have your campaign contributions up to date. I wrote about that danger in a Regulation article here.

The GM bankruptcy here is a small template. As Holman points out,  when politicians and political appointees have great power to decide who gets money and who doesn’t, watch out. Oh, no, I forgot; our political appointees are so much more uncorruptible than the Eurocrats that sort of thing can’t happen here. (That was a joke)

His last two paragraphs are better than anything I can write. Go read them again. My one disagreement: Modern financial systems are fine. Modern political systems have abandoned rule of law in favor of a monarchic rule by discretion of appointed bureaucrats. That is incompatible with any financial system.
ECB dilemma

ECB dilemma

It was announced yesterday that  Europe will have a new, central bank supervisor run by the ECB, much as our Fed combines monetary policy and bank supervision. Be careful what you wish for, you just might get it.

One big unified central agency always sounds like a good idea until you think harder about it. This one faces an intractable dilemma.

Here’s the problem. Why not just let Greece default?“ is usually answered with "because then all the banks fail and Greece goes even further down the toilet.” (And Spain, and Italy).

So, what should a European Bank Regulator do? Well, it should protect the banking system from sovereign default. It should declare that  sovereign debt is risky, require marking it to market, require large capital against it, and it should force banks to reduce sovereign exposure  to get rid of this obviously “systemic” “correlated risk” to their balance sheets. (They can just require banks to buy CDS, they don’t have to require them to dump bonds on the market. This is just about not wanting to pay insurance premiums.) It should do for the obvious risky elephant in the room exactly what bank regulators failed to do for mortgage backed securities in 2006.


Moreover, it should encourage a truly European market. Greek, Spanish, Italian banks failing is no problem if large international banks can swoop in, pick up the assets, and open the doors the next day. Bankruptcy is recapitalization.  Greece needs a national banking system as much as Chicago (same population) does.

All well and good. And all diametrically opposed to the ECB’s “crisis-fighting” agenda. The right arm of the ECB should be protecting the banking system in this way. But the left arm of the ECB is using banks as sponges for sovereign debt.

In trying to manage the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB has bought huge amounts of sovereign debt. It has lent  euros to banks that in turn have bought large amounts of sovereign debt (often, I gather, with not so subtle pressure from their governments).  It has lent more euros to the same banks to replace deposits that are quite wisely fleeing out of those banks.

How can the right arm protect the banking system from sovereign default, while the left arm wants to stuff the banking system with sovereign debt?

Converesely, how can the left arm do anything but print euros like mad, now that the right arm has responsibility for the banking system?  Lending to banks who buy sovereign debt was always excused by the idea that the bank shareholders bear the credit risk and national supervisors take care of that problem. Now it’s in the ECB’s lap. Politically, can the ECB really shut down national banks, stiff the creditors, and let them be taken over by big pan-european banks?

I bet on the outcome: print euros like mad, keep pretending sovereign debt is risk free, and prop up existing banks. Let’s hope I’m too cynical. For once.


Experimental evidence on the effect of taxes

Experimental evidence on the effect of taxes

Much of our “fiscal cliff” debate revolves around the incentive effects of raising marginal taxes on high incomes. High tax advocates used to say that taxes won’t hurt growth that much, and advocated them for other reasons.  Now they are advocating that even a 91% federal income tax rate, on top of state, sales, etc, as we had in the 1950s, (not counting all the loopholes!) will actually be good for the economy and also raise lots of revenue.

This seems to me like magical thinking, and a great testament to how people can persuade themselves of anything if it suits the partisan passion of the moment.  But wouldn’t it be nice if someone would run an experiment for us?

Fortunately, Europe has been running a very useful set of experiments on what happens if you address yawning deficits with high income, wealth and property taxes. Which brings me to a report from the Telegraph

Almost two-thirds of the country’s million-pound earners disappeared from Britain after the introduction of the 50p (percent) top rate of tax, figures have disclosed.
In the 2009-10 tax year, more than 16,000 people declared an annual income of more than £1 million to HM Revenue and Customs.

This number fell to just 6,000 after Gordon Brown introduced the new 50p top rate of income tax shortly before the last general election….

It is believed that rich Britons moved abroad or took steps to avoid paying the new levy by reducing their taxable incomes.

George Osborne, the Chancellor, announced in the Budget earlier this year that the 50p top rate will be reduced to 45p from next April.

Since the announcement, the number of people declaring annual incomes of more than £1 million has risen to 10,000.

However, the number of million-pound earners is still far below the level recorded even at the height of the recession and financial crisis….

Far from raising funds, it actually cost the UK £7 billion in lost tax revenue
That’s just one year. Usually, we think that it takes a while for high taxes to have effects. It takes a while for people to move, shelter income, close down businesses, not start businesses, not go to school, etc. Hitting the Laffer limit in one year is pretty impressive.

Update: Thanks to JM Pinder below I went back to the HMRC report which is indeed more detailed. Some highlights:
The 50 per cent additional rate of income tax was introduced on 6 April 2010. It was the first increase in the highest rate of tax in the UK for over 30 years, and was expected to yield around £2.5 billion…

This report provides the first comprehensive ex-post assessment of the additional rate yield using a range of evidence including the 2010-11 Self Assessment returns. The analysis shows that there was a considerable behavioural response to the rate change, including a substantial amount of forestalling: around £16 billion to £18 billion of income is estimated to have been brought forward to 2009-10 to avoid the introduction of the additional rate of tax. …[This is a suggestion that it’s a one time loss. We’ll see]
…
The modelling suggests the underlying behavioural response was greater than estimated previously in Budget 2009 and in March Budget 2010, decreasing the pre-behavioural yield by at least 83 per cent. This result is also consistent with that contained in the Mirrlees review, and suggests the additional rate is a highly distortionary form of taxation.
Don’t miss the bigger point here. The US discussion harks back to the great old 1950s, ignoring the much more relevant evidence right before us from Europe: Want to try cutting deficits (very slightly) with high marginal taxes, especially on investment, along with minor “cuts” (declines in growth rates) of spending, but no substantial change in the welfare state? Hey, they just tried it! Their economies sink, and they don’t get much revenue.
Unraveling the Mysteries of Money

Unraveling the Mysteries of Money

Harald Uhlig and I did a fun interview run by Gideon Magnus (Chicago PhD) at Morningstar. We talk about the foundations of money, fiscal theory, monetary policy, European debt problems, etc. Gideon framed it well, and Harald is really sharp. Somebody combed my hair. A cleaned up version of the interview appeared in the Morningstar Advisor Magazine (html) (A prettier pdf)



A link in case the video doesn’t work or doesn’t embed well (if you see “server application unavailable” the link usually still works), or if you want the original source.

The video starts a little abruptly, as it left out Gideon’s thoughtful introduction (it’s in the Magazine) and framing question:

Gideon Magnus: I want to discuss the value of money and the idea that money is valued similarly to any other asset. Are there really assets backing money? If so, what are they? John, please explain.

The future of central banks

The future of central banks

A WSJ Op-Ed. Here is a pdf for non subscribers:

Momentous changes are under way in what central banks are and what they do. We are used to thinking that central banks’ main task is to guide the economy by setting interest rates. Central banks’ main tools used to be “open-market” operations, i.e. purchasing short-term Treasury debt, and short-term lending to banks.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, however, the Federal Reserve has intervened in a wide variety of markets, including commercial paper, mortgages and long-term Treasury debt. At the height of the crisis, the Fed lent directly to teetering nonbank institutions, such as insurance giant AIG, and participated in several shotgun marriages, most notably between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch.

These “nontraditional” interventions are not going away anytime soon.

Many Fed officials, including Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, see “credit constraints” and “segmented markets” throughout the economy, which the Fed’s standard tools don’t address. Moreover, interest rates near zero have rendered those tools nearly powerless, so the Fed will naturally search for bigger guns. In his speech Friday in Jackson Hole, Wyo., Mr. Bernanke made it clear that “we should not rule out the further use of such [nontraditional] policies if economic conditions warrant.”

But the Fed has crossed a bright line. Open-market operations do not have direct fiscal consequences, or directly allocate credit. That was the price of the Fed’s independence, allowing it to do one thing—conduct monetary policy—without short-term political pressure. But an agency that allocates credit to specific markets and institutions, or buys assets that expose taxpayers to risks, cannot stay independent of elected, and accountable, officials.

In addition, the Fed is now a gargantuan financial regulator. Its inspectors examine too-big-to-fail banks, come up with creative “stress tests” for them to pass, and haggle over thousands of pages of regulation. When we think of the Fed 10 years from now, on current trends, we’re likely to think of it as financial czar first, with monetary policy the boring backwater.

A revealing example of where we are going emerged last spring, admirably documented on the Fed’s website. Using its bank-regulation authority, the Fed declared that the banks that had robo-signed foreclosure documents were guilty of “unsafe and unsound processes and practices"—though robo-signing has nothing to do with the banks taking too much risk.

The Fed then commanded that the banks provide $25 billion in "mortgage relief,” a simple transfer from bank shareholders to mortgage borrowers—though none of these borrowers was a victim of robo-signing.

The Fed even commanded that the banks give money to “nonprofit housing counseling organizations, approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.” Why? Many at the Fed see mortgage write-downs as an effective tool to stimulate the economy. The Fed simply used its regulatory power to help meet that policy goal.

Even if you think it’s a good idea (I don’t), a forced transfer from shareholders to borrowers in pursuit of economic policy is the province of the executive branch and Congress, subject to reproof from angry voters if it’s a bad idea.

The Fed said candidly that it was acting “in conjunction” with the state attorneys general and the Justice Department. So much for an apolitical, independent Fed.

True, $25 billion is couch change in today’s Washington. But you can see where we are going: Hey, nice bank you’ve got there. It would be a shame if the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau decided your credit cards were “abusive,” or if tomorrow’s “stress test” didn’t look so good for you. You know, we’ve really hoped you would lend more to support construction in the depressed parts of your home state.

Conversely, when the time comes to raise interest rates, how can the Fed not consider that doing so will hurt the profits of the too-big-to-fail banks now under its protection?

This is not a criticism of personalities. It is the inevitable result of investing vast discretionary power in a single institution, expecting it to guide the economy, determine the price level, regulate banks and direct the financial system. Of course it will use its regulatory power to advance policy goals. Of course, propping up the financial system will affect monetary policy. If we don’t like this sort of outcome, we have to break up the Fed into smaller agencies with narrowly defined mandates.

The European Central Bank’s political power is, paradoxically, even greater. The ECB was set up to do less—price stability is its only mandate, and it is not a financial regulator. But the ECB holds the key to the euro-zone’s central fiscal-policy question. It has bought the debts of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, and it is lending hundreds of billions of euros to banks, which in turn buy more of those sovereign debts.

Eventually, the ECB will have to suck up this volcano of euros, by selling back the bonds it has accumulated. If it can't—if the bonds have defaulted, or if selling them will drive up interest rates more than the ECB wishes to accept—then the ECB will need massive funds from German taxpayers to prevent a large euro inflation. It might ask for a gift of German bonds it can sell, as “recapitalization,” or it might ask for a bond swap of salable German bonds for unsalable southern bonds. Either way, German taxes end up soaking up excess euros.

Our views of central banks have changed every generation or so for centuries. The idea that central banks are centrally responsible for inflation and macroeconomic stability only dates from Milton Friedman’s work in the 1960s. It’s happening again, and it would be better to think clearly about what we want central banks to do ahead of time.

Mr. Cochrane is a professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute.

A good Greek story

A good Greek story

Matt Jacobs sent along a link to a great story from Greece on Reuters,  “Lessons in a shrimp farm’s travails.” The whole article is worth reading, but here are a few tidbits:

Just over a decade ago, Napoleon Tsanis set out from Sydney with 11 million euros and a dream to build a shrimp farm in his ancestral homeland… What he got was years of wrestling Greek bureaucracy and a court battle with a civil servant…

it’s the civil servants that are throwing you into this labyrinth on purpose,“ Tsanis, 44, said. "The law gives them the latitude to delay you or punish you.”

…A process that would take just two or three months to complete in Australia got stuck in a maze of official opinions and permits across several ministries. Greek politicians assured him that the paperwork would be done in 18 months, but that date came and went with no progress.

… then, though, another law change that sought to keep aquaculture projects small meant Tsanis had to break up his farm into sections to go ahead.

…One of the main obstacles to more investment is the legal jumble that dictates how Greek businesses work. Even government officials admit the lack of clear laws and the endless requests for opinions, studies and permits are there to give work to unionized specialists.

“There are whole businesses and technical offices employing engineers and experts specifically for the purpose of licensing,” said Tsakanikas at the IOBE think tank.

Red tape often leads to corruption.

Tsanis said he steadfastly refused to bribe anyone. In one incident, in 2005, he appealed to a minister in Athens to get a permit unstuck. “The minister called in the public servant who was refusing to give us the permit and ordered him to issue it the next morning,” he said, declining to specify the minister or ministry involved. “When we went back to get it, the civil servant told me: ‘Australian, that guy is a politician and he’ll be gone tomorrow, but I’ll be here waiting for you.

The only European Union country not to have a fully functioning land registry - despite collecting EU funds to set it up and then paying penalties when it failed to do so - Greece still lacks a comprehensive zoning law and building rules.

"Several interests prefer a fuzzy system they can manipulate,” Papaconstantinou said. “We must simplify building permits, which are a hub of corruption.”

After his shrimp farm opened, Tsanis had hoped to build a 120 million euro golf resort. But when the local authorities decided they didn’t want it, he opted not to fight.

This story rings with several of the themes on this blog, and I can’t resist hitting you over the head a bit.

The nature of “regulation.” In the popular discussion “regulation” means a wise system of rules that keep order in markets. Here is regulation in action.

There are different kinds of regulation. This is “regulation” by a deliberately vague forest of laws and rules, which give great discretionary power to the functionaries who administer those regulations. And clearly, they and their cronies like to keep it that way.

This is not “regulation” by clear rules, which you can quickly appeal in court if they are misapplied. The lack of title, zoning, and property rights falls in the same bucket.



Let us not feel superior, fellow Americans. This is the system of regulation to which we are crashing. Dodd Frank and Obamacare look a lot like Greek zoning laws, as far as the power of appointed officials vs. the rule of law are concerned.


Currency. Many of my macroeconomics colleagues think the main problem with the Greek economy is an “overvalued” exchange rate and thus too high wages. Rather than see high unemployment drive down wages that are “sticky” by some magic mechanism (even Paul Krugman admits he doesn’t really know why wages are “sticky”), they would like to see Greece have a Drachma to devalue, or what the heck, devalue the whole euorozone, as even Anil Kashyap and Martin Feldstein have recently argued, along with Austan Goolsbee and more reliable liberals.

How much of Mr. Tsanis’ troubles does this analysis describe? Not zero, in fact. The article says
He survived, he said, thanks to the 30 percent appreciation of the Australian dollar versus the euro in recent years
He doesn’t even mention wages. I guess you have to open a factory before you have to start paying people.

You assign a percentage. Add up whether, faced with this story, the first thing you want to do is devalue the currency, or maybe if as economists we should be writing opeds about “shock liberalization” instead. Decide if this economy will liberalize on its own, given time, and “breathing space” by more German subsidies.

Micro vs. macro. In Greece’s slump, as in ours, how much is this, “microeconomic” problems solveable only by micro liberalization, and how much is “macroeconomic,” solveable by central banks, “stimulus” programs and the like?
Common sense from France

Common sense from France

Today’s WSJ has a lovely editorial from Pascal Salin, professor emeritus of economics at the Université Paris-Dauphine. It echoes many of the things I’ve said about the euro crisis, but with deeper political insight….and it’s from France.

A few tidbits with comment

Contrary to what is claimed daily in the media by politicians and many economists, there is no “euro crisis.” The single currency doesn’t have to be “saved” or else explode.
The present crisis is not a European monetary problem at all, but rather a debt problem in some countries—Greece, Spain and some others—that happen to be members of the euro zone. … there is no logical link between these countries’ fiscal situations and the functioning of the euro system.
A currency union can work just fine without fiscal union.
..the deficits now plaguing these countries were, in large part, justified only a few years ago as necessary to initiate so-called “recovery policies."  But it is always an illusion to believe that governments could increase total demand and thereby induce producers to produce more….The present state of affairs in countries that engaged in stimulus blowouts in 2008 and 2009 should serve as proof of the failure of the Keynesian model.
A letter from Europe that rejects the confusion between common currency and sovereign default, and  sees the abject failure of stimulus? There is still hope. 

I found Prof. Salin’s view of the political situation most interesting:
The "euro crisis” is a pure political construction without any economic content. It could even be said that the crisis is a splendid opportunity for many politicians to impose some of their longstanding goals on everyone else. For instance, before the introduction of the euro, many politicians who called themselves Europeans considered monetary union a stepping stone to political union….
So, in Prof. Salin’s view, the Euro worthies are deliberately linking sovereign default to breaking up the euro zone in a deliberate effort to scare wary voters into accepting fiscal union. 
This process has begun and continues to develop. Politicians now argue that “saving the euro” will require not only propping up Europe’s irresponsible governments, but also reinforcing and centralizing decision-making. This is now the dominant opinion of politicians in Europe, France in particular.
It’s really the “centralizing decision-making” that is the problem not “political union.” The US at least historically had a political union without requiring the rules on provenance of prosciutto to be written by bureacrats in Brussels.
There are a few reasons why politicians in Paris might take that view. They might see themselves as being in a similar situation as Greece in the near future, so all the schemes to “save the euro” could also be helpful to them shortly….
Yeah, but the Germans may not have any money left by then!

What to do instead? Someone else likes “shock liberalization:”
The real solutions to Europe’s debt problems lie in tax cuts and deregulation, and it’s here that national politicians should turn their attention. Pan-European cooperation won’t deliver any government from its fiscal or economic crises. Only national governments, each working independently to implement the best possible policies, can hope to achieve that.
What a breath of fresh air.

I can’t wait to read Prof. Salin’s next letter on France’s 75% tax – especially in the face of the UK’s disastrous and quickly repealed experience with a 50% tax.  (16 billion pounds forecast revenue turned in to two.)